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THE THIRD DEGREE AND THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF CRIMINATION*
FRim ImViN~t
I
It has perhaps always been the practice, and certainly it was at
one time the duty, of public officers making arrests for crime, or
custodians of prisoners charged with crime, to interrogate them as
to their connection with the crime charged. In view of the rules as
to the admission of confessions in evidence this practice has always
been open to abuses. Although the officer is by law required to
inform the accused of his rights, at least to the extent of warning
him that anything he may say may be used against him, and although
the courts have found it-necessary to scrutinize carefully the circum-
stances of such confessions, there can be no doubt that the zeal of
those making arrests and having the custody of prisoners, and latterly
detectives (for convenience this group will hereafter be referred to
as police officers), has often led to the admission in evidence of
confessions not voluntarily made and not always accurately repeated
by the witness. In recent years it has become a frequent and even
a usual custom to subject one accused of crime to a prolonged cross
examination by police officers often acting in relays and continuing
the ordeal for hours. There is abundant evidence that less refined
methods of cruelty are, especially in the larger cities, frequently
practised, and that actual physical torture has not infrequently been
employed-all this for the purpose of extorting a "confession" used
for the purpose of obtaining further evidence, and too often used
directly as evidence. Police officers are naturally deeply interested
in justifying arrests they have made. They are naturally inclined
because of their experience with criminals to presume guilt. They
are sometimes at least inclined to believe that the end justifies the
means. The admonition in the State of New York that the greatest
caution should be observed in granting a divorce' on the uncor-
*The author claims no originality for the thoughts herein expressed. The
third degree and the privilege against self crinination have each been much
discussed, and they have doubtless been discussed in their relations one to the
other. It is sought herein merely to direct attention to, and invite discussion of,
one phase of these relations. The lack of documentation is due to the general
knowledge of lawyers concerning both subjects, and the linitations of space
forbidding any elaborate treatment.
tMember of the New York State bar; former Dean of the Cornell Law School.
'Winston v. Winston, I65 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273 (I9OI).
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roborated testimony of a private detective might without danger to
justice be rightfully extended to police officers and to other classes
of cases. This process of extorting confessions which may or not be
true has become so well recognized as to acquire the distinctive name
of the "third degree." It has become an intolerable evil, and some
method should be found to prevent it, consistent at the same time
with the conviction of the guilty and the protection of the innocent.
No one except a few laymen fanatically interested in the enforcement
of the criminal law in certain classes of offenses will question the
statement thaf unlawful means employed to enforce the law may
lead to greater evils than its non-enforcement.
It behooves us therefore to consider why we have the third degree,
and what evil in the law has given it a reason or excuse for existence.
If there is such an evil the proper remedy is the removal of that evil.
The writer would not advocate any relaxation in the rules limiting
the use in evidence of confessions. In spite of lay opinions to the
contrary all lawyers know that testimony as to confessions is ac-
companied by such dangers that it should be received with the
greatest caution, and that juries should be carefully instructed
against their natural tendency to give such evidence more weight
than it deserves. It is not appropriate here to go into discussion of
that topic. The writer believes that the problem of the third degree
may be met without the slightest relaxation in the law relating to
confessions. On the other hand a relaxation of the restrictive rules
relating to confessions, while it might reduce the temptation to
perjury on the part of police officers and remove the taint of ille-
gality from some of their practices, would actually encourage the
extortion of confessions, and might thereby on the whole increase
rather than mitigate the mischief.
II
The third degree is practised for two purposes: one is to obtain
information leading to other evidence tending to a conviction; the
other is to extort a confession that can be used in evidence only
through the perjury of the officers extorting it. So far as the first
purpose is concerned it may be said that it fails unless the prisoner's
statements turn out to be truthful. In that case the ends of justice
in the particular prosecution may be subserved; but there remains
the great public evil of permitting officers of the law to resort to
unlawful, disingenuous and cruel means to achieve their purpose.
If the law can be enforced only through a reversion to savage, or at
best mediaeval methods, there must be something wrong with the
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law. As to the second purpose nothing can be said in its defence
unless we are to abandon the results of experience and receive in
evidence testimony of confessions without regard to the circumstances
of the confession or the credibility of the witnesses thereto.
III
In the opinion of the writer the privilege against self crimination
is the fundamental cause of the practice of the third degree. It
certainly has been brazenly made the excuse for the practice. Can
and should something be done in respect of this privilege that will
aid at least in removing the evil which it has created?
This privilege is by no means ancient. The best exposition of
its history has probably been given by Dean Wigmore.la It grew out
of the early struggles between the common law courts and the
ecclesiastical courts. It did not become firmly embodied in the
English law prior to the seventeenth century; but it was firmly
established at the time of the separation of the Colonies. 2 It extended
and still extends not only to protecting a person accused of crime
from being examined against his will in that prosecution, but it
protects any witness in any proceeding from being compelled to
disclose facts that might expose him to a criminal prosecution or
that might even lead to evidence that would have such effect.3 The
privilege goes even further, but it is not necessary here to discuss
such extensions.
One of the amendments to the Federal Constitution insisted upon
by the states practically as a condition of its ratification provides
that "no person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. ' '4 In view of the language used and the
context it may well be doubted whether the intention was to do
more as a matter of constitutional limitation than to prevent the
compulsory testimony of a defendant in a criminal prosecution
against himself. The same language was afterwards embodied in
the constitutions of nearly every state.'
However, the tendency has been to construe the provision as
co-extensive with the privilege that had then become a part of the
laWIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) C. LXXVIII.
2flbi.
3This is so elementary that it seems useless to cite authorities. See, however,
People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219, 38 N. E. 303 (1894).
4UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendments, Art. V.
5The Constitution of New York of I777 does not contain the limitation. It
first appears in the Constitution of 1821, Article Seventh, § VII.
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English law. It is in respect of the unquestionable effect of the
constitutional provision and not in respect of its judicial extension
that the writer believes there should be a modification.
The historical reasons for the privilege had at the formation of
our present governments been so far removed that little danger
could have been apprehended of their recurring.8
Dean Wigmore and others, some of whom he quotes,7 justify the
retention of the privilege for various reasons, some of which do
not seem entitled to very great weight. A brief reference to the
criminal procedure of the time affords very substantial reasons for
the preservation of the privilege both to the extent of its consti-
tutional language and also the extended meaning "That has been
given such language. Purely political prosecutions with biased
judges, juries that now would be called packed, and the whole
influence of government thrown behind the prosecutioi, had been
common in England and not unknown in the Colonies. The person
accused was not of right entitled to counsel, nor was he entitled to
compulsory process against witnesses. The right to compulsory
process and the right to counsel were provided by the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, as the right to counsel had already
been protected by the first Constitution of the State of New York."
The mere securing of these two rights did not render inappropriate
further protection to innocent persons unjustly accused. The
greatest evil, however, was that because of his interest the defendant
was incompetent as a witness in his own behalf.9 It would have
been monstrous to compel a defendant to testify against himself
when he was not permitted to exculpate himself, or to take the stand
to contradict or explain the testimony of witnesses against him.
All these reasons have now disappeared in so far as they apply to
the testimony of a witness in a criminal prosecution against himself.
Everyone accused of crime may compel the attendance of witnesses
6The Constitution of New York of 1777, immediately after the Article pro-
tecting religious freedom, contained (Article XXXIX) a provision that "No
ministei of the Gospel or priest of any denomination whatever shall, at any time
hereafter, under any pretense or description whatever, be eligible to or capable
of holding any civil or military office or place within this state." This would
seem to contradict the statement in the text except for the fact that the Con-
stitution 'of 17 7 7 did not protect the privilege now under discussion. If the
framers knew of its origin they did not regard its protection any longer necessary
on that ground.
74WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note ia, § 2251.
'Constitution of 1777, Art. XXXIV.
9In New York this disability was not removed until x869. Laws 1869, c. 678.
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on his behalf. He is entitled to counsel, although, if we are to give
any credence to newspaper reports, he is often forbidden communi-
cation with counsel until after the third degree has been administered.
This denial of his rights will disappear with the disappearance of the
third degree. He certainly has now the right to take the stand and
testify in his own behalf. It is true that if he avails himself of this
privilege the tendency is somewhat to broaden the field of cross-
examination on the theory that by voluntarily taking the stand he
has submitted himself to the fullest inquiry. If this theory is not
well founded the reply is that it is based upon his voluntary waiver
of his privilege. If there were no privilege for him to waive there
would be neither reason nor excuse for applying different rules to
his examination.
In short, all substantial reasons for the privilege have disappeared
as applied to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and, in accordance
with an old maxim, the reason having ceased the law should cease
with it.
IV
What is the proper remedy? As already intimated the writer
would by no means suggest that in a collateral proceeding any
person should be compelled to give testimony that might lead to
his prosecution for a crime or to other evidence that would expose
him to such prosecution. Nor does the writer believe that he should
be required by similar means to expose himself to a penalty, or, as
the phrase goes, to disgrace himself, where under existing rules he is
not obligated so to do. Furthermore, no right minded person in the
present time would advocate vesting in police officers or even in
magistrates the power of their own initiative to institute and carry
on inquisitorial proceedings, unfounded on definite and specific
charges, to determine whether a citizen may at some time have been
guilty of some infraction of the law. When, however, a specific
complaint has been made against a designated person, charging him
with a criminal offence, and that person has been apprehended so
that he has to meet the charge, a different state of affairs is presented.
The purpose of the privilege was not to shield the guilty but to
protect the innocent, and the innocent formerly needed that pro-
tection. He now no longer needs it, provided his examination is
properly safeguarded. With counsel to protect his legal rights, with
the right to compel the attendance of witnesses in'his own behalf,
why should not a man accused of a criminal offence, as well as a
party to a civil action, be required to testify as to the matters then
in issue? The guilty might have much to fear from such a course:
the innocent nothing, provided the safeguards be sufficient.
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Of course this result could be accomplished only by constitutional
amendment, but the difficulty is not insuperable. Recent experience
has shown it is much easier for a zealous and determined body to
bring about an amendment of the Federal Constitution than it is
to get rid of one that many, and probably most, people believe to
have been unwisely made. Amendments to state constitutions
are of annual occurrence. In the state of New York eight were
ratified at the election of 1927. For several years there has been
much talk of a "crime wave." Whether or not such a wave has
occurred or is still in progress, the result of the talk has been legis-
lation in some respects drastic to a questionable degree, rendering
convictions easy and penalties severe. The amendment proposed
would certainly throw terror into the guilty, and with proper safe-
guards would not endanger the innocent, and might even protect
them. It should therefore be comparatively easy at the present
time to bring about the change.
V
Reference has been made to safeguards. Although the privilege
is not ancient it possesses the common law characteristic of developing
out of social conditions existing at the time of its development.
While in this instance these conditions have largely disappeared, it
would be unwise to assume that they have been forever removed;
that they will never in any degree recur; or that a remedy at one
time found desirable and perhaps necessary, should be absolutely
destroyed without careful consideration of present conditions and
forecasts of the future. Some of the most important remedial enact-
ments seem to us archaic because they afforded a perfectly complete
remedy to the evil at which they were aimed and so the evil was
forgotten. To abolish them would invite a recurrence of the evil,
although it would probably be modernized in form. We should
therefore feel our way.
Perhaps it would not be safe at present to go further than to
restate the constitutional limitation in such a way as to permit the
compulsory examination of the defendant upon his trial. He would
be interrogated only as other witnesses, by the prosecuting attorney
under the protection of the court. With protection of counsel and
the court the innocent would have nothing to fear. Our only concern
for the guilty should be that he be accorded the legal rights to which
he is entitled, and be not subjected to illegal, cruel or savage procedure.
It follows in connection with this that positive measures should
be taken to protect the accused from the third degree or anything
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resembling it. All reasonable excuses, except perhaps one, for the
private interrogation of prisoners would then disappear. The law
should prohibit under severe penalties the interrogation of a prisoner
by police officers, should provide sufficiently severe penalties for the
violation of the prohibition, and should rigidly exclude from evidence
the results of such interrogation no matter how conducted.
The one remaining excuse is the search for further evidence. If
it be thought unwise absolutely to prohibit any interrogation before
trial, a tentative step might be taken by providing an almost im-
mediate preliminary hearing which might, if occasion demanded,
be adjourned, but in which the defendant might be subjected to
interrogation, never by the magistrate, but by the prosecuting
officer, with the right to the accused to have counsel present and
participate in the examination. Our Bar is naturally and properly
repelled by French criminal procedure, but this is because the magis-
trate acts not only as a judicial officer, but practically also as a
prosecutor. It is not the fact of the examination, but the manner
of the examination that repels us. Some magistrates will err; some
may fall into the state of mind of the French magistrates and our
own police officers; some may be over zealous in protecting the
accused; these are defects of human nature that the law can not
immediately correct. They are found occasionally among our own
judges under the existing system; but there has not yet appeared
any general complaint as to the fairness of attitude of any class of our
judicial officers. We must in this case disregard the exceptional
magistrate as we disregard the idiosyncrasies of the exceptional
judge in a higher court.
Certainly the Bar should be careful not to advocate inquisitorial
proceedings whether or not we have a fictitious defendant named
John Doe. Nothing should be tolerated that would permit the
compulsory examination of an individual at the behest of police
officers or others merely as a "fishing expedition" to find out whether
a crime has been committed, and if so, by whom it was perpetrated.
That was one of the original evils that even now shows a tendency
to recur. There should be no examination except of one already
charged with a specific offence, and the examination should be
limited to that offence.
VI
So far the discussion has related solely to abolishing the third
degree. There are certain incidental evils that the remedy proposed
would also abolish. Only two will be mentioned.
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To avoid certain mischiefs resulting from the extension of the
privilege, statutes have been enacted conferring immunity on those
who voluntarily testify to matters that might otherwise incriminate
them in other proceedings. These statutes have been held valid
where they afford immunity coextensive with the privilege. 0 To
avoid this consequence it has been common in certain investigations,
largely those conducted by congressional and legislative committees,
and often for partisan purposes, and for the sake of newspaper
publicity, to demand that witnesses waive their immunity as a
condition of their testifying. In the first place this demand is an
insult to any honest man. In the second place it is a measure of
coercion and a whittling away of the constitutional privilege. If
the privilege is no longer desirable the remedy is by amendment of
the Constitution and not by legislative or judicial paring down or
misconstruction.
The statutes rendering a defendant a competent witness in his
own behalf, in order not to impair the constitutional privilege,
generally provide that the defendant's failure to testify shall not
weigh against him. We have therefore the remarkable spectacle
of the Court solemnly instructing the jury that they must not
consider the defendant's failure to testify in reaching their verdict.
An eminent former Federal Judge is reported to have said after
giving such an instruction, "I am required to give this instruction,
but it is rather peculiar, isn't it?" No instruction can prevent a
juror from drawing in his own mind an inference that seems to him
irresistible. If the modification herein proposed should become
effective, the failure of a defendant to testify would merely mean that
neither side desired his testimony; and the inference that now
necessarily must be drawn, in spite of instructions, by practically
every juror, would no longer be drawn. Thus one great absurdity
would be removed from the administration of the law.
1°Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, x6 Sup. Ct. 644 (1896). Cf. Counselman v.
Hitchcock, i42 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1892).
